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THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY AND ITS MEDICAL CARE
PROVIDERS: RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST OR ANTITRUST?

Robyn E. Marsh*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States health care system consists of relationships between consumers, as potential and actual patients, and the health care
providers who treat them. These relationships are, in an important
sense, unequal, because the parties involved openly rely on the information and knowledge provided by the opposite party - the patient
who relates to the health care provider (hopefully) an accurate and
relevant medical history, and in turn, the provider who diagnoses and
treats the patient derived from (again, hopefully) extensive and essential education and clinical training. For this reason, consumers choose
their health care providers on notions of immense trust that state and
federal laws licensing those health care providers mandate qualified,
competent and careful medical professionals. In recent years, as
health care costs have continued to increase, many non-physician
groups,' those being health care providers who did not attend medical
school, have engaged in exhaustive lobbying efforts to expand the
scope of practice afforded to them by state laws. While the increase of
health care professionals in the market may seem beneficial to consumers as a way to increase access to care or decrease the ever-rising
costs of health care, it may still create precarious risks for patients and
consumers of health care services when the scope of a non-physician's
practice exceeds his or her level of education or clinical training
experience.
In response to increasing health care costs, falling reimbursements
for physician services, and general impediments to access to medical
care for consumers, non-physician providers, specifically advanced
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law, May 2010; B.A., Political Science, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, May 2002.
1. Examples of licensed non-physician practitioners include, but are not limited to, advanced
practice nurses (such as nurse practitioners and nurse anesthetists), podiatrists, chiropractors,
and physician assistants. The scope of this Article will be limited to focus on the advanced
practice nursing profession as compared to physician services.
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practice nurses and physicians' assistants, are staffing retail-based
health clinics around the country to provide convenient, speedy, and
inexpensive medical care to patients. 2 The recent advent of in-store
health clinics at national retail superstores such as Walgreens, CVS/
Caremark@, and Wal-Mart has provoked physicians and their respective professional medical societies to argue that these clinics are
largely unregulated and put patients' health at risk.3 While the clinics
present many benefits for consumers, physicians are losing patients
and income, and, whether or not prompted by these professional consequences, physicians and their advocates discourage the use of stopand-shop medical treatment by claiming reduced quality of care. 4
This Article will demonstrate that in light of the chronic turf battle
between physicians and non-physician practitioners, and the related
lobbying for scope of practice expansion legislation,5 non-physician
practitioners are finding new ways to effectively compete with physicians in the provision of medical care to patients that antitrust laws
are not necessarily designed to remedy.
II.

BACKGROUND

For decades, physicians have enjoyed a monopoly in the provision
of patient care services. 6 State regulations have bolstered that monopoly by restricting non-physicians' opportunities to practice
medicine. 7 Because state legislatures have a great deal of latitude in
the regulation of non-physician groups, it has proven difficult to develop nationwide, coordinated, and uniform policies regarding the
provision of health care services by non-physician practitioners. 8 In
response to rising health care costs, geographic and economic barriers
2.
3.
CHI.
4.

See infra Section III. B.
See Bruce Japsen, Doctors push law on clinics in stores; Patients are put at risk, they contend,
TRIB., May 6, 2007, at Bl; see also infra Section III.C.
See generally Richard Bohmer, The Rise of In-Store Clinics - Threat or Opportunity?, 356
NEw ENG. J. MED. 765 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-CareProviders' Scopes of Practice:A Primerfor Policymakers, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 301, 306 (2002); FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS OF THE UNITED STATES, ASSESSING SCOPE OF PRACTICE IN
DELIVERY: CRITICAL OUESTIONS IN ASSURING PUBLIC ACCESS & SAFETY
(2005), available at http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2005_grpol-scope-ofpractice.pdf. See also infra
Section II.D.
6. See generally Kevin Grumbach & Janet Coffman, Physicians and Nonphysician Clinicians:
HEALTH CARE

Complements or Competitors?, J. AM. MED. Ass'N, Sept. 2, 1998, at 825; see also John McKinlay

& Lisa Marceau, When There is No Doctor: Reasons for the Disappearanceof Primary Care
Physicians in the U.S. During the Early 21st Century, in 67 NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
PUBLIC ACCESS 1481 (Nov. 2008).

7. Grumbach & Coffman, supra note 5, at 825.
8. Id.
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to consumer access medical care, as well as increased demand for
providers, many non-physicians have confronted the monopolistic delivery of health care. 9 Specifically, nurse practitioners have expanded
the professional role of the registered nurse to "advanced practice,"
offering them professional autonomy to provide primary care to patients instead of secondary care to that of a physician.' 0 This Section
will provide an overview of the history of regulation of medical professionals in the United States and how antitrust concerns must be
balanced with public policy to promote patient safety in the provision
of health care.
A.

Scope Of Practice: Who Is Licensed To "PracticeMedicine"?

State Medical Practice Acts define what constitutes the "practice of
medicine," and no one definition is exactly the same across the fifty
states." As a general matter, "scope of practice" is comprised of the
activities that an individual health care practitioner is permitted to
perform within a specific profession or specialty, as determined by factors such as education, training, and experience. 12 There is immense
variation within and among states in the provisions of scopes of practice among physician groups.' 3 Scope of practice regulations establish
boundaries within and between medical care professions and attempt
to distinguish practitioners of medicine from non-physician practitioners and other health care providers who are not licensed medical
doctors.14
The health care market regards physicians as medical doctors in a
learned profession who are well schooled in the practice of medicine
and have extensive, specialized education and clinical training.' 5 The
basic training of a physician includes four years of premedical education at a college or university, four years of medical school, and a resi9. Karla Kelly, Nurse PractitionerChallenges to the Orthodox Structure of Health Care Delivery: Regulation and Restraints on Trade, 11 Am. J.L. & MED. 195 (1985).
10. See id.
11. See Safriet, supra note 4, at 306.
12. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4.
13. Safriet, supra note 4, at 313-14; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483,
488 (1955) (holding that while it was well within the police power of a State to regulate the
examination of eyes even though the law limited the practice of opticians, the Supreme Court
noted that it would not "strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought. . . . 'For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not
to the courts.'") Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)).
14. BARRY R. FURROw, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 150 (6th ed.
2008).
15. American Medical Association, Becoming a Physician, http://www.ama-assn.orglamalpub/
category/14365.html (last visited June 3, 2010).
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dency consisting of three to seven years of postgraduate education and
training.16 Physicians must pass an exam to become licensed to practice medicine in the state in which they seek to provide health care
services.17
In comparison, non-physicians generally have less rigorous clinical
training and education requirements, and are restricted or even prohibited by state law in their use of the modifier "doctor" to describe
their practice.18 Licensed non-physician health care providers do not
"practice medicine" in the traditional sense, even though they administer services to patients that are viewed as "medical care."1 9 A typical graduate program for advanced practice nurses, including nurse
practitioners, nurse anesthetists, and nurse midwifes, ranges anywhere
from two to three years. 20 Nurse practitioners are registered nurses
who complete graduate-level education and advanced clinical training
and to practice, national board certification and state licensing are required. Even so, scope of practice issues are implicated in the context
of advance practice nursing when marketed as a substitute to primary
care, because the length of training and education programs is half
than that of a physician, and entry into the workforce to treat patients
is similarly less stringent. 21 More specifically, and for purposes of this
Article, nurse practitioner educational programs are typically geared
towards a specific specialty, patient population, or geographical region. 22 Consequently, specialty courses for advanced practice nursing
vary across schools and programs, and no uniform requirement for
didactic or clinical education for nurse practitioners exists. 23 At bot16. Id.
17. Id.
18. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4.
19. FURROW, supra note 13, at 149.
20. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA SCOPE OF PRACTICE DATA SERIES: NURSE
PRACTITIONERS 25 (2009), available at http://www.aanp.org/AANPCMS2/publicpages/08-0424
%20SOP%20Nurse%2ORevised%2010-09.pdf. Nurse practitioners must have a graduate degree
to enter the profession. While most programs award master's degrees or post-master's certificates, many programs are moving toward the nurse practitioner doctoral degree with the degree
title of doctor of nursing practice. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, POSITION
STATEMENT ON NURSE PRACTITIONER CURRICULUM (1993), available at http://www.aanp.org/
NR/rdonlyres/59523729-0179-466A-A7FB-BDEE6816OE8E/0/NPCurriculum.pdf.
21. Jennifer Fisher-Wilson, Primary Care Delivery Changes As Nonphysician Clinicians Gain
Independence, at 597, Annals of Internal Medicine, American College of Physicians (2008). See
also Ginger Rough, For Many, A Nurse PractitionerIs THE DOCTOR, The Ariz. Republic, Feb.
12, 2009, at Al.
22. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 19, at 27.
23. Id. "Any program that is to receive federal funding, however, must follow the basic curriculum outlines provided in the most recent versions of the Criteriafor Evaluation of Nurse
PractitionerPrograms and [the National Organization of Nurse Practitioner Faculties]'s Advanced Nursing Practice: Curriculum Guidelines and Program Standards." Id.
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tom, this posits a significant patient safety issue when scope of practice laws do not align with professional capabilities, especially when
nurse practitioners are substituted for primary care to patients instead
of physicians. 24
In addition, state scope of practice laws often fill the void of broad
federal regulation to promote inter- and intra-state commerce, which
can foster competition, 25 and courts are reluctant to second guess the
laws enacted by state legislatures, especially on matters concerning
medical care. 26 For example, a given non-physician's authority to administer health care services, which may or may not be based on educational or clinical requirements or even qualified abilities, can vary
greatly depending on such factors as geographic location of practice
(e.g., rural vs. urban areas), the type of patient being treated (e.g.,
elderly vs. pregnant women) and the actual nature of the practice setting (e.g., hospitals vs. retail "minute clinics"). 27 Depending on the
state, non-physician practitioners may be authorized to practice independently, required to collaborate, be supervised, or practice under a
combination of these provisional instructions with licensed physicians.28 Many state statutes that mandate physician "supervision" or
"collaboration" have failed to define the term, leaving physicians (supervisors) and non-physicians (supervisees) to work out the appropriate roles and scope of responsibility among themselves. 29 Obviously,
this agitates existing turf battles for professional autonomy among
health care providers.

24. See, e.g., California Healthcare Foundation, Retail-based health clinics: Six State Approaches to Regulation and Licensing, at 3, available at http://www.chcf.orgl-/media/Files/PDF/
R/RetailClinicsSixStateApproaches.pdf.
25. See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (holding that nothing in the Sherman Act suggests that its purpose was to restrain state action from activities directed by its
legislature). "Because of its local character also there may be wide scope for local regulation
without substantially impairing the national interest in the regulation of commerce by a single
authority and without materially obstructing the free flow of commerce, which were the principal objects sought to be secured by the Commerce Clause." Id. at 363. See also James W. Hilliard
& Marjorie E. Johnson, State Practice Acts of Licensed Health Professions: Scope of Practice, 8
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 237 (2004).
26. See, e.g., Deborah Haas-Wilson, CATO Institute on Policy, The Regulation of Health Care
Professionals Other Than Physicians, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv15n4/
regl5n4d.html.
27. See, e.g., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Non-Physician Practitioner Questions and Answers, available at https://
www.cms.gov/ContractorLearningResources/downloads/JA0418.pdf (posted August 17, 2005).
28. See id.
29. Gene A. Blumenreich, Legal Briefs: Supervision, AM.Ass'N OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS,

Oct. 2000, http://www.aana.com/Resources.aspx?id=2335.
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The Medical Profession Is Not Exempt From
Antitrust Regulation

Antitrust laws seek to protect competition and consumer welfare,
not actual competitors. 30 Federal antitrust laws are set forth in the
provisions of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission
Acts.31 These statutes are based on the principles that free and unrestricted competition benefits society as a whole and that restrained
or controlled competition results in the misallocation of economic resources. 32 Antitrust laws are enforced by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ").33 For purposes
of this Article, the practice of medicine is regarded as a "trade" within
the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 34 Section 1 of which provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, . . . is declared to be illegal." 35 Section 2 of the Act
provides that monopolization, "or attempt[s] to monopolize, . . . any

part of the trade or commerce" are deemed illegal. 36 In sum, the
Sherman Act endeavors to promote efficiency or consumer welfare by
eliminating conduct that suppresses competition within a properly defined antitrust market.37
Licensed professionals are not without means to influence the market and are subject to federal antitrust laws. Physicians and non-physicians engage in vigorous competition, both within and outside the
legal scopes of their profession, in the quest for consumer recognition.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,3 8 the United States Supreme Court

enunciated the principle that Congress did not intend any sweeping
"learned profession" exclusion from the reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act.39 In its analysis, the Court conceded that states have a com30. See generally Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) ("It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for 'the protection of competition, not
competitors."') (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
31. 15 U.S.C. §H 1-15 (West 2010); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement and
the Consumer, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divstats/1638.pdf (last visited June 5, 2010).
32. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (West 2010).
33. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006); see also Fed. Trade Comm'n, A Guide to the
Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.govIbcp/edu/pubs/consumer/general/genO3.shtm (last
visited June 5, 2010).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
35. Id.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
37. See John J. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence:A Symposium on the Economic, Political and
Social Goals of Antitrust Policy Introduction, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1187-88 (1977).
38. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
39. Id. at 787.
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pelling interest in the practice of professions as part of their broad
police power "to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests," 4 0 and in some instances, the state legislature "may decide
that 'forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession.' 41
Goldfarb and its progeny resulted in other courts examining potential anticompetitive behavior within learned professions under the
more lenient "Rule of Reason" 42 judicial review standard, rather than
the strict "Per Se" 4 3 standard, because professional services, by their
nature, may significantly differ from other business services based on
ethical norms or considerations within the profession.44 Goldfarb implied that anticompetitive conduct is only immune from Sherman Act
scrutiny when the state, through its sovereign police power, mandates
the practice in question and actively supervises its process - commonly referred to as the state action immunity doctrine. 45 While a
40. Id. at 792.
41. Id. (citing United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952)). See also Am.
Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443, 450 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982)
(holding that business aspects of the activities of the medical associations fell within the scope of
the FTC because the record showed that the AMA "intended and expected" state and local
medical associations to enforce limitations on advertising and solicitation of services of nonphysicians, which effectively prohibited natural competition in the provision of medical services.). Id.
42. The Rule of Reason is a standard of analysis employed by courts to determine whether
certain commercial behavior is an unreasonable restraint of trade to warrant sanctions under
antitrust laws. The doctrine originally surfaced in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), and was later affirmed by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The standard creates a rebuttable presumption whereby the
defendant must show legitimate business reasons for anticompetitive behavior. Under such an
approach, the plaintiff must prove (a) a conspiracy among two or more entities, (b) an injury to
competition caused by conspiracy, and (c) an intent among the entities to restrain competition.
See generally Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 48-49.
43. The Per Se approach is the most stringent standard by which a court examines anticompetitive behavior. Conduct that is so restrictive of trade and inherently unreasonable that it is
considered effectively illegal, without any further deliberation, is a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666 (7th Cir. 2000).
44. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (interpreting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89, n. 17 (1975)).
45. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. The state action immunity doctrine was created by the United
States Supreme Court to exempt states from antitrust prosecution when certain activities are
undertaken in specific economic areas where the state has decided to regulate, rather than allow
the marketplace to discipline itself - essentially authorizing anticompetitive conduct. Actions of
the state itself are not subject to the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350
(1943) (holding an anticompetitive marketing program which "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state" was not a Sherman Act violation). The antitrust
immunity doctrine is invoked when a state enacts legislation that clearly articulates an intent to
displace competition with regulations, where subsequent regulatory actions can be deemed immune from federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court outlined a two-pronged test, known as the
Midcal test, for determining whether the "state action immunity doctrine" will protect anticom-
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state will seek to promote competition in all industries, the regulation
of the health care profession requires the balancing of competitive interests with the protection of consumers of health care services. 46
Thus, if state laws or regulations require a certain practice with anticompetitive effects, it will be exempt from antitrust scrutiny so long
as it meets the state action immunity doctrine standard. 47
In a market with finite resources for health care providers, a fine
line exists between collaboration and competition. 48 While the practice of medicine is a profession that benefits public welfare, it is also a
business that affects trade and interstate commerce. Likewise, Goldfarb stands for the proposition that learned professions, including
medicine, are not exempt from antitrust law. "It is no disparagement
of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has a
business aspect, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act '[o]n its face ...
shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within the Act every person
engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize
commercial intercourse among the states." 49 As the provision of
health care in the modern world continues to expand and adapt to
changes in science and technology, it is clear that the activities of medical professionals play an integral role in commercial activities, and
any anticompetitive conduct promoted or encouraged by members of
the profession, aside from being condoned by state law, may result in
a strain on commerce and negatively affect consumer welfare.

petitive conduct of private parties directed to enforce a state regulatory program. The basic
judicial inquiry requires (1) anticompetitive actions (2) of private parties (3) taken pursuant to a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed policy by the state to supplant competition with
regulation, be (4) subject to active state supervision. However, the debate over the breadth of
the state action doctrine often comes down to how much weight should be given to each prong
and likewise, what constitutes "active state supervision." Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at
105-106, 114.
46. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4.
47. See generally Parker, 317 U.S. at 350 (holding an anticompetitive marketing program
which "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state" was not a
Sherman Act violation); Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 114. See also Clark C. Havighurst,
Contesting Anticompetitive Actions Taken in the Name of the State: State Action Immunity and
Health Care Markets, 31 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 587 (2006).
48. Benjamin G. Druss et al., Trends in Care by Nonphysician Clinicians in the United States,
348 NEw ENG. J. MED., 130, 136 (2003).
49. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 (quoting United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
553 (1944)).
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The Structure Of The Medical Care System Makes Antitrust
Relief An Obstacle For Non-Physician Practitioners
Excluded From The Product Market

For non-physician practitioners to succeed in their antitrust claims,
they must prove that two or more entities agreed or conspired to restrain competition and that the conspiracy resulted in economic harm
within the relevant product market.5 0 This can prove very difficult for
non-physician practitioner plaintiffs, depending on how the geographic and product markets are defined. Certain activities trigger
heightened antitrust scrutiny of health care providers, such as joint
action between competitors, denial or limitation of professional privileges of certain practitioners at hospitals or other similar facilities, or
involvement in an exclusive provider network or other integrated delivery system that poses a threat to consumer welfare by effectively
limiting choice in care. Antitrust concerns can arise when non-physicians are denied access to hospitals, physicians refuse to include nonphysician practitioners in their provision of medical care, and in situations where managed care organizations place certain contingencies
on reimbursement for services, such as the requirement of physician
supervision over non-physician practitioners in the provision of certain health services to patients.5 ' If powerful enough, these initiatives
can essentially eliminate a certain class of providers from the market,
but it is not always clear whether such actions are anticompetitive and
in violation of antitrust laws, or actually meeting the objective of vigorous competition in the health care market.
Both physicians and non-physicians are exposed to the same antitrust liability and are entitled to the same defenses as other industries
that are subject to antitrust laws.5 2 The medical staff structure has
bolstered significant physician control over access to hospital privileges based on the overarching concern of assurance of quality patient
care and commitment to professional values.5 3 The denial of staff
privileges at a medical facility or other medical organization, by itself,
is not an unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 5 4 It is sometimes reasonable for hospitals to deny privileges
50. Greg Timmons & Nancy Ridenour, Restraint of Trade Implications for Nurse Practitioners: Denial of Hospital Admitting or Staff Privileges, 5 J. AM. ACAD. NURSE PRAcr. 177 (1993).
51. FURROW, supra note 13, at 1124-25; see also supra text accompanying notes 26 and 27.
52. See generally Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
53. FURROW, supra note 13, at 850. Likewise, the structure of the health care environment
and provision of medical care has led various courts to assert that federal antitrust laws have no
role in lawsuits alleging conspiracy to deny hospital privileges or the requirement of physician
supervision. See id.
54. Kaczanowski v Med. Ctr. Hosp., 612 F. Supp. 688, 695 (D. Vt. 1985).
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to avoid potential liability for acts or omissions by non-physicians who
do not possess the same levels of advanced medical training as medical doctors.55 In fact, exclusive dealing arrangements with certain
physician providers are generally regarded as pro-competitive because
they can help coordinate and maximize use of personnel and facilities
to ensure that different types of providers are available to address patient needs. 56 Because physicians are afforded the exclusive right to
practice medicine based on their education and certifications, it necessarily follows that many hospitals or clinics would exclusively deal

with physicians instead of non-physicians in providing care to their
patients.5 7
Even though some exclusive dealing arrangements can be used to

exercise market power to effectively eliminate competitors and create
barriers to entry, such agreements are unlawful only if their anticompetitive effects outweigh their pro-competitive benefits.58 Hospitals
typically lack economic incentives or significant market power to exclude non-physicians from practicing in their facilities. 59 Instead, economic incentives are based on employing the highest quality and
quantity of qualified practitioners on hospital staffs with an understanding that the demand for hospital services will fall as the price of
medical services rises.60 Even so, many non-physician practitioners
file suit challenging exclusive dealing arrangements or alleging conspiracy to eliminate their services in favor of those offered by physicians, thereby obstructing access to patients and stunting their

professional development.61 Many non-physicians are unsuccessful in
55. Id.; see also Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding, as a
threshold matter, that hospitals must make choices about the types of qualifications a practitioner must have to apply for staff privileges in certain fields of practice, and those restrictions
allow the hospitals to provide more efficient and higher quality health care, reduce malpractice
exposure, and productively compete with other hospitals in the market).
56. Robert E. Bloch & Donald M. Falk, Antitrust, Competition, and Health Care Reform,
HEALTH Amr., Spring 1, 1994, at 216.
57. FURROW, supra note 13, at 1124-25.

58. Bloch, supra note 55, at 216.
59. Andrew K. Dolan, Antitrust Law and Physician Dominanceof Other Health Practitioners,
4 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 675, 679 (1980).

60. Id. See also Timmons & Ridenour, supra note 49, at 177-78.
61. See, e.g., Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1263 (10th Cir.
2006) (holding that a managed care organization's refusal of membership to optometrists in
favor of ophthalmologists was not economically motivated, and pro-competitive justifications
existed for the preference); Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d
476, 483 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that while there was evidence of close contact between the state
professional psychiatric society and insurer Blue Shield, where the society recommended and the
insurer implemented a policy prohibiting reimbursement for services rendered by psychologists
even though identical services billed through psychiatrists were reimbursed, it did not rise to the
level of a Sherman Act violation). See also FURROW, supra note 13, at 1124-25.
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challenging such arrangements because of proffered defenses of increased efficiencies, where the expansion of consumer choice in medical providers promotes quality of care and consumer welfare, and in
effect, does not implicate the need for federal antitrust regulation in
the health care market. 62
D.

That's MY Job! Professional Turf Wars Resulting From
Diminished Monopoly Power Of Physicians And
Expanded Scope Of Practice Of Non-Physicians

The fact that physicians have a monopoly on the provision of health
care is not due to anticompetitive behavior, but is instead a result of
state legislative actions to protect citizens from potentially "harmful"
health services rendered by under-qualified practitioners. 63 In almost
every state, physicians are given exclusive rights in "the practice of
medicine" as a result of their extensive education, training, and
clinical experience. 64 Meanwhile, non-physician practitioners are limited in the amount of health care they can provide to patients based
on state legislative boundaries. 65 Consumers lack key information
about the quality and price of medical services, because they lack the
expertise to evaluate the qualifications of their health care providers
and because standards of care are actually dictated by the medical
profession itself. 6 6 In addition, consumers are often uninformed as to
the full range of alternative sources of health care or how the prospective outcomes of these alternatives would allow them to make informed decisions regarding whether to choose a licensed physician or
a non-physician practitioner for their respective medical needs. 67 For
the most part, consumers blindly rely on the lawmakers within their
62. See Havighurst, supra note 46 and accompanying text. Many of these cases have been
aptly named the "junk food of antitrust healthcare litigation," see, e.g. FURROW, supra note 13, at
1124-25 (citing Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Care Sys., 993 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993) for
proposition of "a rare example" of a successful antitrust challenge to a staff privileges determination based on factors such as the hospital's pretextual explanations defending its actions and
the professional shortcomings of other physicians with staff privileges).
63. See Safriet, supra note 4, at 306.
64. Id.
65. See supra Section II.A.
66. See, e.g., Congressional testimony of Paul B. Ginsburg, Ph.D., President of Center for
Studying Health System Change, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health, hearing on "What's the Cost?: Proposals to Provide Consumers with Better Information About Healthcare Service Costs" (March 15, 2006),
Center for Health System change, available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/823/
67. See, e.g., legal commentary of Deborah Haas-Wilson, Arrow and the Information Market
Failure in Health Care: The Changing Content and Sources of Health Care Information, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1031 (2001).
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states to dictate the appropriate boundaries for scopes of practice for
physicians and non-physicians. 6 8
The overlap in the range of medical care provided by physicians and
non-physicians is fostered by the systemic organization of health
care. 69 Medical professions are highly regulated by state and federal
agencies, which in turn influence the reimbursement policies determined by managed care organizations and insurance companies.70
Many routine tasks traditionally performed by physicians are now

within the scope of non-physician practice, and the range of technical
complexity of these tasks is expanding. The stakes are highest for
those providers with the greatest overlap in training or specialty,
where they compete for the same prospective patients, such as between general practitioner physicians and nurse practitioners.7 ' In

fact, results of a nationwide survey illustrate that consumers are confused or uncertain about the qualifications and educational backgrounds of health care providers, specifically the variance between
medical doctors and limited license health care practitioners. 72

As the lines between the practice of medicine and complementary
health care services become more blurred in the delivery of modern
68. See PR Newswire, infra note 70. Highlights from the Coalition for Healthcare Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency (CHART) nationwide telephone survey of 1000 adults
illustrated that American consumers, as would-be patients, are confused or in the dark about the
qualification and educational backgrounds of health care providers, specifically the variance between medical doctors and limited license health care practitioners. For example, according to
the survey, 72% of those surveyed believed podiatrists were medical doctors, 70% believed optometrists were medical doctors, 59% believed psychologists were medical doctors, 56% believed chiropractors were medical doctors, and 33% believed dental assistants were medical
doctors.
69. See Richard A. Cooper, Health Care Workforce for the Twenty-First Century: The Impact
of Nonphysician Clinicians, 52 ANN. REV. MED. 51 (2001).
70. John J. Perry, The Rise and Impact of Nurse Practitionersand Physician Assistants On
Their Own and Cross-Occupation Incomes, 27 J. CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 494 (2009). See also
Myrle Croasdale, Advanced-Practice Nurses Seek Wider Scope in 24 States, Am. MED. NEWS,
Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://www.ama-assn.orglamednews/2008/04/21/prl20421.htm.
71. Id. Examples include optometrists who are granted surgical laser privileges competing
with ophthalmologists, and psychiatrists and psychologists and the authority to prescribe psychotropic medications to patients. In addition, some podiatrists are effectively advocating for an
expanded scope of practice to the ankle and beyond, in competition with orthopedic surgeons.
72. PRNewswire, Physician and Dentist Coalition Announces Support for Health Care Truth
and TransparencyAct of 2006, June 27, 2006, available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/health/
552162/physician anddentistcoalition_announces.supportjorhealthcare-truth/index.html.
The survey was conducted by the National Consumers League and provided significant support
to the introduction of bipartisan legislation to increase transparency in the nation's health care
system making it unlawful for providers to misrepresent their qualifications to patients in efforts
to increase consumer awareness. This type of legislation goes hand-in-hand with efforts to quell
scope of practice expansion efforts by non-physician groups, since the ultimate goal is the protection of consumers.
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health care, state laws and regulations attempt to keep up with the
ever-changing practices within the medical profession.73 While physicians maintain that only they can engage in the practice of medicine,
many non-physician groups are lobbying to expand their respective
scopes of practice in the provision of what may be considered "medical" services. 74 However, the non-physician response to the monopolistic regime of the physician-dominated provision of health care advocating expansion of authority and autonomy - raises serious concerns about patient safety, especially in the absence of uniform national standards of scopes of practice.75 Because each non-physician
group has its own curriculum, services, and approaches to care within
its respective regulatory framework, state legislatures, which are not
necessarily familiar with the required education and training of individual health care provider classes, usually adopt and codify the specific practice acts of non-physician groups without taking into account
the need for a fluid, uniform standard to ultimately protect
consumers. 76
Both state legislatures and courts must balance competing objectives of professional autonomy, the safety and welfare of citizens, and
above all, the overarching goals of halting the ever-increasing health
care costs and the paucity of practitioners available to consumers.
While state agencies and local medical associations presumptively enforce these practice requirements, it is not the type of state action the
Sherman Act was meant to proscribe as anticompetitive.77 Despite
73. See generally, Hilliard, supra note 24, at 237.
74. See Safriet, supra note 4, at 301. In fact, a primary argument for expanding scopes of
practice rights for non-physicians and rates of reimbursement for services rendered is that nonphysicians serve a "complementary role" and will provide care for populations that lack access
to physicians, such as those living in rural areas or poor patients without insurance. Druss.,
supra note 47, at 136. For example, in 1977, the Rural Health Clinics Act provided the first
direct Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and
certified nurse midwives, limited to areas where there was a shortage of physicians and nonphysicians worked in free-standing rural clinics directed by physicians. See Cooper, supra note
67, at 57. However, payments are now allowed in all geographic areas, and no longer restricted
to just rural areas, as permitted under state licensing laws. See DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, MEDICARE COVERAGE OF NON-PHYSICIAN PRACTI-

TIONER SERVICES, June 2001 at 4, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oeilreports/oei-02-00-00290.pdf.
75. Catherine Dower, PromisingScope of Practice Models for Health Professions,The Center
for Health Professions, University of California, San Francisco, at 1 (2007).
76. Richard A. Cooper, Roles of Nonphysician Clinicians as Autonomous Providers of Patient
Care, 280 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 795 (1998).

77. See Havighurst, supra note 46 and accompanying text. See also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1980); New England Motor Rate Bureau,
Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1074 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the state action immunity doctrine
is based on the Supreme Court's determination that congressional intent with regard to federal
antitrust laws was not meant to preempt state programs and policies).
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the fact that state legislatures delineate the scope of medical care in
which a non-physician practitioner may engage, largely based on education and training, these laws do not express a preference for physicians over non-physicians, nor do they advocate for the exclusion of
non-physicians from facilities in favor of physicians only.

Even

though some courts hint that legislative advocacy within states is the
preferred remedy for turf wars within certain professions,78 medical
providers are far from achieving perfect harmony because of competing considerations of professional autonomy and patient welfare in the
health care market.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF ANTITRUST REGULATION IN HEALTHCARE -

IF YOU CAN'T JOIN 'EM, BEAT 'EM .. . RIGHT?
This Section will analyze how the general composition of the health
care industry has influenced the regulation of its professionals, inflaming existing tensions among physicians and non-physicians, with regard to independent practice and patient care, which the antitrust laws
were not specifically designed to remedy. The regulation of the provision of health care must consider patient safety and welfare in addition to the promotion of professional autonomy in the health care
field. The introduction of retail-based health clinics to the market has
created a facility for non-physicians to practice without having to
jump through hoops for hospital privileges or kowtow to supervisory
or collaborative physician demands. 79 In effect, this has increased
choice for consumers while addressing costs of, and access to, medical
care concerns. Fundamentally, retail-based health clinics are fostering
effective competition among medical care providers, and physicians
are now on the other side of the battle with non-physicians, who are
often promoted as a substitute to primary care practitioners. Retailbased health clinics differ from urgent care clinics, commonly known
78. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 229 (7th Cir. 1983). In addition, many of
the joint efforts by physicians and state medical societies to promote public health and safety in
the provision of health care services by employing tools of legislative advocacy are immune from
the scope of the Sherman Act under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The doctrine earned its
name from two cases considered by the Supreme Court in which the Court limited the enforcement of federal antitrust laws against certain private acts meant to urge government legislative
action in an effort to protect fundamental First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. ., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See also Mo. v. Nat'l Org. for
Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980). For example, the AMA and other professional organizations have formed the Scope of Practice Partnership (SOPP) as an advocacy group to influence
the regulation of non-physician health care providers, which is exempt from antitrust scrutiny
under the doctrine permitting advocacy.
79. Dolan, supra note 58, at 678. See also infra Section III.B.
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as "doc-in-the-box" services primarily staffed by physicians, and are
giving doctors a run for their money - literally.80 These clinics raise
important issues regarding the future of providing primary health care
to patients, and the long term effects of the clinics' introduction to the
medical market, both good and bad, remain to be seen.
A.

The Health Care System As A Competitive Product Market

In general, competitive markets have certain common characteristics. On the supply side, providers compete with one another for customers on the basis of price, quality, and sometimes quantity of
services.81 On the demand side, consumers weigh quality and cost
when choosing to purchase a provider's product or service. 82 The
composition of markets for medical care are different from other markets because of the influential role of federal and state governments in
terms of regulation of scope of practice, licensing and credentials, and
even financial subsidies, in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, and tax
expenditures, allow some consumers greater access to medical care
than they would otherwise have.83 However, the de facto medical monopoly dominated by physicians, in combination with the restrictive
licensing laws and regulations that limit the scope of services offered
by non-physician practitioners, has arguably created higher prices for
consumers while limiting meaningful choice in providers. 84
The introduction to the market of retail-based health clinics arguably promotes competition among physician groups by increasing price
and quality competition in the market for basic health care services.85
These health clinics are a "demand-side solution" to increased health
costs because they allow "consumers (patients) to discipline providers
who compete against one another on the basis of quality and price
. . . ."86 As for the supply-side, however, while there is a shortage of
80. See generally Bohmer, supra note 3, at 765.
81. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); see also AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, Market Power Handbook 55 (2005).

82. Id.
83. FURROW, supra note 13, at 567-69.
84. See SUE A.

BLEVINS, THE MEDICAL MONOPOLY: PROTECTING CONSUMERS OR LIMITING

COMPETITION?, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS, No. 246 (Dec. 15, 1995), available at http://

www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub id=1105&full=1; see also David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets, in lB HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS 1102 (1998). See also infra Section III.D, discussing criticisms of continuity and qual-

ity of care issues with retail-based health clinics.
85. Kaj Rozga, Retail-based health clinics: How the Next Innovation in Market-Driven Health
Care is Testing State and Federal Law, 35 AM. J. LAW & MED. 205, 213-14 (2009).
86. Id. (citing Uwe Reinhardt, Economists in Health Care: Saviors, or Elephants in a Porcelain
Shop, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 337, 339 (1989)).
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physicians in the United States, most retail-based health clinics are
based in urban areas where there are plenty of primary care physicians to choose from and thus do not solve the chronic paucity problem of providers.87 In fact, according to a recent study, approximately

thirty million people live in a federally designated shortage area
where there is an inadequate supply of health care providers.88
Increased costs of health care and issues regarding access to care
spurred the introduction of retail-based health clinics through state
legislation by addressing regulatory barriers.89 Furthermore, most,

but not all, retail-based health clinics employ nurse practitioners
rather than physicians and, depending on state law, may or may not
require physician supervision.9 0 According to the American College
of Nurse Practitioners, twenty-three states allow nurse practitioners to
treat patients without a physician present while twenty-eight states require documented physician involvement, either in the form of supervision, collaboration, or consultation. 91 Also, in some states, nonphysicians are directly employed by the drugstore company giving rise

to concern that such providers of health care might place the interests
of their employer above those of the patient. 92 Even though the impetus for retail-based health clinics was based on efforts to offer greater
consumer choice at lower costs for the provision of health care, the
varied laws across state lines and the lack of a uniform national stan-

87. Jennifer F. Wilson, Primary Care Delivery Changes As Nonphysician Clinicians Gain Independence, 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 597, 598 (2008) ("Because they are for-profit, they are
not necessarily an answer to improving health care access in rural areas, shortage areas, or any
other areas of the most need.") (quoting Scott A. Shipman, MD, MPH, assistant professor of
pediatrics and family and community medicine at Dartmouth Medical School and researcher at
the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice).
88. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, HELP WANTED: MORE U.S. DOcrORs;
PROJECTIONS INDICATE AMERICA WILL FACE SHORTAGE OF M.D.s By 2020, available at http://
www.aamc.org/workforce/helpwanted.pdf.

89. CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, HEALTH CARE IN THE EXPREss LANE: RETAILBASED HEALTH CLINICS Go MAINSTREAM 22 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.chcf.org/
documents/policy/HealthCarelnTheExpressLaneRetailClinics2007.pdf.
90. Id. The purpose behind requiring active state supervision is not to monitor potential anticompetitive activity, but rather to keep private action aligned with select state policy, such as

protection of its citizens. In the context of the medical profession, states regulate the practice of
medicine by defining permitted scopes of practice within its borders, likely a reflection of its
chosen state policy; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
91. CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FOUNDATION, HEALTH CARE IN THE EXPRESs LANE: THE
EMERGENCE OF RETAIL-BASED HEALTH CLINICS 13 (July 2006), available at http://www.chcf.org/
documents/policy/HealthCareln'MeExpressLaneRetailClinics.pdf.

92. Sarah Kershaw, DrugstoreClinics Spread,and Scrutiny Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007,
at Al.
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dard relating to scope of practice of non-physicians presents significant concerns for quality of care and patient safety. 93
B.

The Rise Of Retail-Based Health Clinics - The Nurse
PractitionerWill See You NOW!

As previously asserted, the training and skills of almost all non-physician groups have changed dramatically in recent years in response to
health care demands, increased costs of care, developments in preventative and curative treatments, and health-promotion strategies. 94
Most importantly, however, the non-physician desire for professional
autonomy appears to be the driving force behind these changes. 95 Intuitively, the nature of the provision of medical care is that a facility is
needed to provide adequate treatment to patients. 96 Thus, when nonphysicians are denied privileges or access to hospitals or similar medical facilities, 97 for whatever pro-competitive proffered justification,
many of these non-physicians, specifically nurse practitioners, make
lemonade out of lemons by instead seeking professional employment
with or access to retail-based health clinics to treat patients.
In fact, the introduction and operation of over one thousand retailbased health clinics around the United States combine quick and convenient medical treatment to consumers with the retail approach of
selling at fixed prices to the consumer patient, regardless of insurance
coverage. 98 These clinics are overseen by an assortment of state agencies without any uniform system of regulation. 99 The concept for retail medical clinics was developed in 2000 by QuickMedx (now known
as MinuteClinic 00 ), and several thousand more are expected to open
in the near future.101 Currently, most clinics are located in states that
grant prescriptive privileges to nurse practitioners and require limited,
if any, physician involvement. 102 However, the growing number and
increasing popularity of retail-based health clinics creates pressure to
93. Id.
94. Safriet, supra note 4, at 305.
95. Richard A. Cooper & Sandi Stoflet, Trends in the Education and Practice of Alternative
Medicine Clinicians, 15 HEALTH AFF. 226 (1996).
96. Dolan, supra note 58, at 678.
97. See infra Section II.C for a discussion of denial of hospital privileges.
98. Vimo RESEARCH GROUP, RETAIL HEALTH CARE CLINICS - OVERVIEW & ATLAS 4 (Sept.

2007), available at http://www.vimo.com/reports/retailclinics.pdf.
99. Kershaw, supra note 89, at Al.
100. The "pioneer and largest provider of retail health care in the United States." CVS
Caremark - History of MinuteClinic, http://minuteclinic.comlen/USA/About/History.aspx (last
visited June 15, 2010).
101. Bohmer, supra note 3, at 765.
102. Id.
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increase the number of nurse practitioners that a physician may supervise, which arguably raises heightened concerns about patient safety,
especially once medications have been prescribed. 03
Perceptibly, these health clinics are consumer-driven models based
out of retail stores, rather than patient-driven health care (like a hospital), and the potential long-term effect of the retail-based health
clinics on health insurance plan insured behavior and the clinics' impact on the health care delivery system is a serious issue for some,
specifically primary care physicians.104 In addition, retail-based health
clinics seem to be responsive to consumer needs and demands in not
only medical care, but also in everyday life. Premised on assigning
patients control of their own health care budgets through devices such
as health savings accounts, retail-based health clinics illustrate that
consumers make choices based on cost rather than on qualifications or
experience.105 As a result, entrepreneurs jumped at the opportunity
to expand on a profitable business model and found a way to provide
less expensive primary care in a convenient setting, for the on-the-go
person who does not have the time or patience to wait in a doctor's
office or emergency room. 106 These retail-based health clinics, the
free-standing, walk-in medical providers often located in drug stores
like Walgreens, CVS/Caremark@, and Wal-Mart, advertise quick service, low fees, treatment to both the insured and uninsured, with little
or no waiting time.107 Whether treated by a nurse practitioner or physician assistant, customers (patients) are provided with acute care for
routine problems ranging from the common cold to routine checkups
and vaccinations. 08 For anywhere from $30 to $60, a patient can be
in-and-out with diagnosis and treatment for an ear infection, sore
throat, allergies, or other common ailments.109 Overall, it seems that
retail-based health clinics are responding to consumer needs, promoting competition in the provision of health care, and providing non103. Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Extending Physician's Standard of Care to NonPhysician Prescribers:The Rxfor ProtectingPatients, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 57-58 (1998) (arguing
that prescribing medications requires "sufficient knowledge to respond" to potential side effects,
or when used in combination with other medications that may not be known to the nonphysician).
104. See Bohmer, supra note 3.
105. JOHN GOODMAN, NETWORKS FINANCIAL INSTITUTE POLICY BRIEF, INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, CONSUMER DIRECTED HEALTH CARE 6 (2006).
106. See Bohmer, supra note 3.
107. See Jeffrey Kluger, Drive-Thru Medical: Retail-based health clinics' Good Marks, TIME,
Sept. 1, 2009.
108. Id.
109. FAMILIES USA, RETAIL MEDICAL CLINICS: OKAY IN A PINCH, BUT No SUBSTITUTE FOR
REAL HEALTH COVERAGE 1 (2007). See also Annie Hsu, Legal Issues ConcerningRetail-based
health clinics, 20 HEALTH LAw. 13 (2008).
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physician clinicians with greater professional autonomy - so what's
not to like? According to primary care physician groups, who are
competing for patients with these clinics' services, the answer is
"plenty."
C.

Retail-Based Health Clinics And Antitrust - NOT What The
Doctor Ordered

The retail-based health clinics themselves are regulated by the
states, and each state, much like the laws governing scope of practice
of non-physician groups, has a great deal of latitude, not to mention
variation, in the regulation of such clinics.110 The application of the
antitrust laws becomes controversial when competition in the provision of health care must be balanced with quality of care. Competition among medical care providers for consumers is usually directed
toward the non-price aspects of medical care, such as education and
licensure, and consumers are legally or effectively prohibited from
making many medical decisions based on inherent market constraints." But antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors.112
Health care practices that seem to impinge on the actual "practice of
medicine" based on state laws and regulations, or create inconveniences for physicians that drive down their incomes, such as being
substituted by non-physician services, usually do not constitute an antitrust violation unless it is shown that such practices also impair consumers' welfare." 3 Countless health care professionals have been
denied adjudicative relief under antitrust laws after filing suit because
their hospital privileges had been denied, suspended, or revoked in
light of pro-competitive justifications offered by hospitals relating to
quality of care or economic efficiencies.1 14
The general effect of retail-based health clinics is that they have
taken away patients from the waiting rooms of primary care physicians.115 Some physicians have criticized the clinics being run by nurse
practitioners as "cream skimming" and a threat to their professional
110. FAMILIES USA, supra note 106, at 2.
111. FURROW, supra note 13, at 150.
112. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
("It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for 'the protection of competition, not competitors."') (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
113. Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in
Health Care, HEALTH AFF. Mar. - Apr. 2002, at 185, 192.

114. FURROW, supra note 13, at 1124-25; see also Oksanen v. Page Mem'I Hosp., 945 F.2d 696,
711 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating "the antitrust laws were not intended to inhibit hospitals from promoting quality patient care through peer review nor were the laws intended as a vehicle for
converting business tort claims into antitrust causes of action.").
115. See generally Bohmer, supra note 3, at 765.
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revenue, especially those that rely on simple appointments, such as
the common cold or routine vaccinations, to subsidize the cost of
more complex, time-consuming appointments. 16 Still, other physicians are less critical and regard retail-based health clinics as a way to
improve access to care for patients, reduce patient wait times, and allow the physicians to spend more quality time with existing
patients." 7
Opponents to the recent advent of these clinics remain dubious
about the quality of care provided at retail-based health clinics and
concerned about their potential to undermine the primary care relationship between patient and physician.118 "It seems clear that retail
[health] clinics could become a disruptive innovation in health care,
capable of fundamentally challenging long-established models of care,
and changing consumer expectations of the cost, quality, and delivery
of care." 119 In addition, critics argue that retail medical clinics impede
continuity of care, which can affect diagnoses of underlying conditions
and the provision of preventative care. 120 This is especially troublesome for physicians because the clinics are modeled for one-time care
rather than ongoing treatment, and some are not required to make
referrals to traditional health care providers or hospitals. 12 1 This particular "business" model precludes clinics from offering comprehensive care in the form of physical exams, diagnostic tests, or follow-up
care, and in the absence of a central health record, largely leaves the
patient (consumer) ultimately responsible for giving any health care
provider a clear picture of his or her medical history.122 However,
regardless of commentary by critics or proponents, retail-based health
clinics appear to fill a need for convenient, easy access to medical care
and, for now, are here to stay.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER MARKETATrENTION LAWMAKERS, VACCINATIONS IN AISLE FIVE!

Whether it is due to the convenience, price transparency, or reduced waiting times for medical treatment, many retail-based health
clinics have gained widespread acceptance in the marketplace.1 23
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 767.
Id.
Id.
Id.

120. CONNECTICUT HEALTH POLICY PROJECT, RETAIL MEDICAL CLINICS: WHAT ARE THEY
AND WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR CONNECTICUT?

(April

2008).

121. Id.
122. See FAMILIES USA, supra note 106, at 2.
123. CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, supra note 86.
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However, state and federal laws have struggled to keep up, and in
addition to considering the needs of medical professionals and competitive business concerns, legislatures must keep consumer welfare
on the forefront when issuing laws and policy. For example, some
states have established restrictions on in-store clinics while others
have banned them altogether. 124 This, however, can raise antitrust
concerns because the retail medical clinics are the primary focus of
regulation, not necessarily all health care facilities, which could put
them at a competitive disadvantage when forced to comply with stringent regulatory standards. For example, in 2008, the FTC admonished
the Illinois state legislature for a bill regulating retail-based health
clinics by prohibiting the sale of alcohol or tobacco products in stores
that house retail-based health clinics.125 As a result, the bill ultimately
failed, largely because of stated anticompetitive concerns that
threatened greater economic repercussions for Illinois consumers.126
Even so, there is no federal regulation of retail-based health clinics,
and compounded by wide-ranging state scope of practice laws, this
could prove a dangerous combination for patients in the long run. 12 7
State legislatures have considered a variety of issues with regard to
these clinics, including, but certainly not limited to, scope of practice
issues for advanced practice nurses who staff the clinics, physician
oversight and ownership requirements, limiting types of services offered, and heightened compliance with public health and sanitation
standards in an effort to protect the health of customers (patients or
not). 128 In addition, states must decide on what they are actually regulating - a business entity or a health care institution. For example,
Rhode Island has prohibited CVS/Caremark@ from opening clinics in
the state, and Florida requires retail-based health clinics to post signs
stating whether a physician is on-site and to disclose the credentials of
the clinic staff to patients, while California has mandated that retailbased health clinics be physician-owned.129 While some states seem to
enact legislation based on the overarching goal of patient safety, 130 in
124. Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, Several States Consider Regulating In-Store Health
Clinics Amid Safety Concerns, in Wall Street Journal Reports, (Aug. 9, 2007), available at http://
kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?DRID=46781
125. See FAMILIES USA, supra note 106.

126. Id.
127. See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, Retail Store Health Clinics:State Legislation and Laws, available at http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/Retailstorehealth
clinicsstateroles2009/tabid/13959/Default.aspx (last updated November 2009).
128. See generally AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, supra note 19.

129. See Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, supra note 121.
130. For example, see 20 CSR 2200-4.200 (Mo. 2008). Missouri requires store-based health
clinics to have a physician immediately available for consultation at all times. A nurse practi-
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contrast, states such as Texas and Wyoming have lessened restrictions
on the list of treatments nurse practitioners are able to administer to
patients as an ostensible effort to protect competitive business.13 '
As such, regulations relating to scope of services provided by nonphysicians and potential physician oversight create an ongoing battle
for the state legislatures in determining the future of retail health
clinic operations across the nation. 132 However, legislation that calls
for greater regulation of retail-based health clinics is subject to intense
antitrust scrutiny when viewed as a restriction on commercial activity,
not as an effort to regulate the professional practice of medical care.
What is more, physicians who notice a decrease in the volume of their
patient visits because of the popularity of retail-based health clinics, or
nurse practitioners who feel hindered by scope of practice regulations
in their respective states, will have little recourse under federal antitrust laws since the laws seek to protect competition, not disadvantaged competitors. 133 If clinics continue to expand across the nation,
as they have in recent years, they will likely attract more regulatory
attention, which may enhance scope of practice expansion efforts by
nurse practitioners or other non-physician groups, creating significant
market repercussions that current laws, antitrust or otherwise, are not
necessarily structured to remedy.
V.

CONCLUSION

Even though the promotion of consumer choice is a fundamental
principle of the free market system, the fact that many consumers lack
the information critical to make informed decisions is the driving
force behind state legislation regulating non-traditional health care
providers. All the same, consumers are lured by the convenience and
affordability of retail-based health clinics. However, lower one-time
costs for patients can lead to increased risks and higher costs over
time if these clinics are not properly and uniformly regulated. Because retail-based health clinics are premised on in-and-out provision
of medical care, there is no real system for consistent care or followtioner and a physician must work together for at least 30 days prior to the nurse practitioner
practicing separately, including at a store-based health clinic location.
131. Health Strategies and Solutions, Retail-based health clinics: Flash in the Pan or Wave of
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up treatment. Thus, if a patient has a serious condition that is misdiagnosed or requires referral to a physician, the convenience and affordability of treatment from a retail clinic is eventually quashed by
the costs and renewed efforts by physicians to subsequently treat the
patient.
Altogether, the lack of consumer information, and essentially
empty promises of convenience and low-cost health care, is the very
reason states must regulate retail-based health clinics. The variation
among state laws regarding non-physician practitioner scopes of practice and the operation of these retail-based health clinics inflame the
existing professional tensions within the health care industry. In sum,
either the federal government should regulate providers of health care
in accordance with antitrust laws, or states should be given wider latitude to define the limits of the provision of health care, anticompetitive or not, with the ultimate goal to protect consumer patients' health
and welfare.

